The Problem of Evil

"...as a philosophical objection to theism, the problem of evil fails to be cogent or compelling. The simple reason for this is that no matter how hard the objection is pressed, there remains no compelling reason to insist that God lacks a good reason for allowing evil...We thus conclude that the problem of evil is not a viable objection to theism. Our broader conclusion is that atheology has yet to produce a reasonably decent objection against belief in the existence of God." - from the text

"Worlds with a revelation of the divine attributes of love and mercy-as well as justice-to rational creatures are simply superior to worlds with no such revelation. These worlds of course which do not include Christ becoming incarnate or Christ's making satisfaction on the cross, thus the state of affairs Christ's being incarnate and Christ's being crucified fail to obtain, and consequently the propositions God is with us, and Christ was crucified are false...such worlds are far inferior to the actual world, thus illustrating very probably what God's reason was for making actual a world which would contain evil."- from an appendix