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In addition to defending presentism against objections, Balaguer argues for two other substantive theses. First, he argues for the metaphilosophical (and anti-metaphysical) view that the question of whether presentism is true is an ordinary empirical question about the nature of physical reality and that this question can't be settled by a priori philosophical arguments. Second, Balaguer argues that presentists should reject the existence of time, times (including the present time), and temporal passage. From this it follows that presentists should reject standard versions of the A-theory--which is surprising because it's widely believed that presentism entails the A-theory.
The version of presentism developed in this book is a metaphysically thin, ontologically parsimonious view that can be thought of as an ordinary empirical hypothesis--a profoundly different view from other versions of presentism in the literature.
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