THREAD: Imām Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī in Fayṣal al-Tafriqa, on the...

THREAD: Imām Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī in Fayṣal al-Tafriqa, on the profound dangers involved in fanaticism (taʿaṣṣub) for, and blind following (taqlīd) of the Ashʿarī (or any other) school of thought. Dār al-Minhāj edition. Translation below. (1)

"Perhaps amongst the remaining schools of thought, the person you follow­ inclines to al-Ashʿarī, and alleges that opposing his position, even in the most minor of details, is a species of incontrovertible disbelief. (2)

I ask him: How does this person know that [al-Ashʿarī] has a monopoly on truth, such that he adjudges [e.g.] al-Bāqillānī to be a disbeliever — after all, he differed with him [al-Ashʿarī] concerning Allah Most High’s attribute of Permanence (al-baqāʾ), (3)

and claimed that it is not an attribute that is superadded to the Essence. Why should al-Bāqillānī be more deserving of [the accusation of] disbelief for disagreeing with al-Ashʿarī, than al-Ashʿarī for disagreeing with al-Bāqillānī? (4)

And why does one of them possess a monopoly on the truth rather than the other? Is this because of being earlier in history (lit. ‘priority in time)? (5)

But the Muʿtazila, and others, came before al-Ashʿarī, so [if being earlier in history determines truth] let the earlier [thinkers] be the possessors of the truth! Or would this be because of a disparity in virtue and knowledge? (6)

But by which criterion did he determine the degrees of virtue, such that he should be justified in concluding that no one in existence is better than the one he happens to follow? (7)

Now, if we make a special dispensation for al-Bāqillānī to differ with al-Ashʿarī, why should we deny this to others? (...) (8)

If you are impartial, you will [by now] have come to know that the one who gives any particular practitioner of rational investigation a monopoly on truth, is the closest of all to disbelief and contradiction. (9)

[This holds true for being the closest to] disbelief, because he has given the individual [he follows] the status of an infallible prophet, (10)

such that true belief (al-īmān) only obtains via agreement with him, and disbelief is not entailed except by disagreement with him. (11)

And [this holds true for being the closest to contradiction] in that every one of the practitioners of rational investigation [amongst the theologians] maintains that rational investigation is a personal obligation, (12)

and forbids blind following. How then can you say, ‘you must engage in rational investigation while blindly following me,’ (13)

or ‘you must engage in rational investigation, and in your rational investigation you must not conclude anything other than what I have concluded (14)

, for everything that I have deemed a proof, you must also deem to be a proof, and everything that I have deemed doubtful, you must also deem doubtful”!? (15)

Notes: Remember, Imām al-Ghazālī says all the above AS AN ASHʿARĪ. For Imām al-Ghazālī, EVEN IF ONE KNOWS THE PROOFS for one's own school of thought, anyone who presumes the truth of their school of thought without critically weighing up the proofs of the opposing schools, (16)

is STILL a muqallid. As I was discussing with Shaykh Marwān Elkateb yesterday, blind taʿaṣṣūb (fanaticism) for your school of thought, and using it as an identity without properly understanding it, is a sign of weakness and superficiality in knowledge. (17)

It is wonderful that the words "Ashʿarī", and "Māturīdī", and "Avicennan", and "Akbarian" are being revived and celebrated, but let's be careful of the identitarianism that is so often a danger for the novice and the dilettante. Then we can get started with the real work! (18)