📚 Roger's Highlights

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A sure cure for the slicer is to pretend you are on a baseball field at home plate. Take your stance to aim your body slightly to the right of second base, but aim your clubface straight at the base. Then hit the ball over the shortstop. Use a 7-iron at first, then a 3-wood. Be careful the downswing is not from the outside. Come down the line on plane and hit a hard fly ball over the shortstop, using primarily the left forearm and possibly rotating the whole left arm. This is the best cure for slicing that I know. Read this carefully and I’m sure you can hook the ball.

Harvey Penick's Little Red Book

Harvey Penick, Davis Love III (Introduction)

The basic elements of American readiness for nuclear war remain today what they were almost sixty years ago: Thousands of nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert, aimed mainly at Russian military targets including command and control, many in or near cities. The declared official rationale for such a system has always been primarily the supposed need to deter—or if necessary respond to—an aggressive Russian nuclear first strike against the United States. That widely believed public rationale is a deliberate deception. Deterring a surprise Soviet nuclear attack—or responding to such an attack—has never been the only or even the primary purpose of our nuclear plans and preparations. The nature, scale, and posture of our strategic nuclear forces has always been shaped by the requirements of quite different purposes: to attempt to limit the damage to the United States from Soviet or Russian retaliation to a U.S. first strike against the USSR or Russia. This capability is, in particular, intended to strengthen the credibility of U.S. threats to initiate limited nuclear attacks, or escalate them—U.S. threats of “first use”—to prevail in regional, initially non-nuclear conflicts involving Soviet or Russian forces or their allies.a The required U.S. strategic capabilities have always been for a first-strike force: not, under any president, for a U.S. surprise attack, unprovoked or “a bolt out of the blue,” but not, either, with an aim of striking “second” under any circumstances, if that can be avoided by preemption. Though officially denied, preemptive “launch on warning” (LOW)—either on tactical warning of an incoming attack or strategic warning that nuclear escalation is probably impending—has always been at the heart of our strategic alert. During the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald J. Trump was reported to have asked a foreign policy advisor, about nuclear weapons, “If we have them, why can’t we use them?”16 Correct answer: We do. Contrary to the cliché that “no nuclear weapons have been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” U.S. presidents have used our nuclear weapons dozens of times in “crises,” mostly in secret from the American public (though not from adversaries). They have used them in the precise way that a gun is used when it is pointed at someone in a confrontation, whether or not the trigger is pulled. To get one’s way without pulling the trigger is a major purpose for owning the gun. (See chapter 20.)

The Doomsday Machine

Daniel Ellsberg

Here’s the best part about deep-tissue work: You can do much of it yourself(7). I used to drive to a massage therapist every week until I learned how to do my own deep-tissue work with a golf ball; a RumbleRoller, which is a hard, ridged foam roller with which I have a love-hate relationship; a Myorope, which looks like several lacrosse balls strung together; and a rolling pin–like device called a Muscletrac.

Beyond Training

Ben Greenfield

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